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The future of warfare lies in the streets, sewers, high-rise buildings, industrial parks, and the sprawl of houses, shacks,
and shelters that form the broken cities of our world. We will fight elsewhere, but not so often, rarely as reluctantly,
and never so brutally. Our recent military history is punctuated with city names--Tuzla, Mogadishu, Los Angeles,
Beirut, Panama City, Hue, Saigon, Santo Domingo--but these encounters have been but a prologue, with the real
drama still to come.
We declare that only fools fight in cities and shut our eyes against the future. But in the next century, in an
uncontrollably urbanizing world, we will not be able to avoid urban deployments short of war and even full-scale city
combat. Cities always have been centers of gravity, but they are now more magnetic than ever before. Once the
gatherers of wealth, then the processors of wealth, cities and their satellite communities have become the ultimate
creators of wealth. They concentrate people and power, communications and control, knowledge and capability,
rendering all else peripheral. They are also the post-modern equivalent of jungles and mountains--citadels of the
dispossessed and irreconcilable. A military unprepared for urban operations across a broad spectrum is unprepared for
tomorrow.
The US military, otherwise magnificently capable, is an extremely inefficient tool for combat in urban environments.
We are not doctrinally, organizationally, or psychologically prepared, nor are we properly trained or equipped, for a
serious urban battle, and we must task organize radically even to conduct peacekeeping operations in cities. Romantic
and spiritually reactionary, we long for gallant struggles in green fields, while the likeliest "battlefields" are cityscapes
where human waste goes undisposed, the air is appalling, and mankind is rotting.
Poor state or rich, disintegrating society or robust culture, a global commonality is that more of the population, in
absolute numbers and in percentage, lives in cities. Control of cities always has been vital to military success,
practically and symbolically, but in our post-modern environment, in which the wealth of poor regions as well as the
defining capabilities of rich states are concentrated in capitals and clusters of production-center cities, the relevance of
non-urban terrain is diminishing in strategic, operational, and even tactical importance--except where the countryside
harbors critical natural resources. But even when warfare is about resource control, as in America's Gulf War, simply
controlling the oil fields satisfies neither side.
The relevant urban centers draw armies for a stew of reasons, from providing legitimacy and infrastructural
capabilities, to a magnetic attraction that is more instinctive than rational (perhaps even genetically absorbed at this
point in the history of mankind), and on to the fundamental need to control indigenous populations--which cannot be
done without mastering their urban centers. We may be entering a new age of siege warfare, but one in which the
military techniques would be largely unrecognizable to Mehmet the Conqueror or Vauban, or even our to own greatest
soldiers and conquerors of cities, Ulysses S. Grant and Winfield Scott.
Consider just a few of the potential trouble spots where US military intervention or assistance could prove necessary in
the next century: Mexico, Egypt, the sub-continent with an expansionist India, the Arabian Peninsula, Brazil, or the
urbanizing Pacific Rim. Even though each of these states or regions contains tremendous rural, desert, or jungle
expanses, the key to each is control of an archipelago of cities. The largest of these cities have populations in excess of
20 million today--more specific figures are generally unavailable as beleaguered governments lose control of their own
backyards. Confronted with an armed and hostile population in such an environment, the US Army as presently

structured would find it difficult to muster the dismount strength necessary to control a single center as simultaneously
dense and sprawling as Mexico City.

Step down from the level of strategic rhetoric about the future, where anyone with self-confidence can make a
convincing case for his or her agenda. Survey instead the blunt, practical ways in which urban combat in today's major
cities would differ from a sanitary anomaly such as Desert Storm or the never-to-be-fought Third European Civil War
in the German countryside (where we pretended urban combat could be avoided) for which so much of the equipment
presently in our inventory was designed.
At the broadest level, there is a profound spatial difference. "Conventional" warfare has been horizontal, with an
increasing vertical dimension. In fully urbanized terrain, however, warfare becomes profoundly vertical, reaching up
into towers of steel and cement, and downward into sewers, subway lines, road tunnels, communications tunnels, and
the like. Even with the "emptying" of the modern battlefield, organizational behavior in the field strives for lateral
contiguity and organizational integrity. But the broken spatial qualities of urban terrain fragments units and
compartmentalizes encounters, engagements, and even battles. The leader's span of control can easily collapse, and it
is very, very hard to gain and maintain an accurate picture of the multidimensional "battlefield."
Noncombatants, without the least hostile intent, can overwhelm the force, and there are multiple players beyond the
purely military, from criminal gangs to the media, vigilante and paramilitary factions within militaries, and factions
within those factions. The enemy knows the terrain better than the visiting army, and it can be debilitatingly difficult to
tell friend from foe from the disinterested. Local combat situations can change with bewildering speed. Atrocity is
close-up and commonplace, whether intentional or incidental. The stresses on the soldier are incalculable. The urban
combat environment is, above all, disintegrative.
The modern and post-modern trend in Western militaries has been to increase the proportion of tasks executed by
machines while reducing the number of soldiers in our establishments. We seek to build machines that enable us to win
while protecting or distancing the human operator from the effects of combat. At present, however, urban combat
remains extremely manpower intensive--and it is a casualty producer. Although a redirection of research and
development efforts toward addressing the requirements of urban combat could eventually raise our efficiency and
reduce casualties, machines probably will not dominate urban combat in our lifetimes and the soldier will remain the
supreme weapon. In any case, urban warfare will not require substantial numbers of glamorous big-ticket systems but
great multiples of small durables and disposables whose production would offer less fungible profit margins and whose
relatively simple construction would open acquisition to genuinely competitive bidding.
Casualties can soar in urban environments. Beyond those inflicted by enemy action, urban operations result in broken
bones, concussions, traumatic-impact deaths and, with the appalling sanitation in many urban environments, in a broad
range of septic threats. Given the untempered immune systems of many of our soldiers, even patrol operations in
sewer systems that did not encounter an enemy could produce debilitating, even fatal, illnesses. One of many potential
items of soldier equipment for urban warfare might be antiseptic bio-sheathing that coats the soldier's body and closes
over cuts and abrasions, as well as wounds. Any means of boosting the soldier's immune system could prove a critical
"weapon of war."
Urban warfare differs even in how "minor" items such as medical kits and litters should be structured. Soldiers need
new forms of "armor;" equipment as simple as layered-compound knee and elbow pads could dramatically reduce the
sort of injuries that, while not life-threatening, can remove soldiers from combat for hours, days, weeks, or even
months. Eye protection is essential, given the splintering effects of firefights in masonry and wood environments, and
protective headgear should focus as much on accidental blows from falls or collapsing structures as on enemy fire, on
preserving the body's structural integrity as much as on ballistic threats.
Communications requirements differ, too. Soldiers need more comms distributed to lower levels--down to the
individual soldier in some cases. Further, because of loss rates in the give and take of urban combat, low-level comms
gear should not be part of the encrypted command and control network. Radios or other means of communication do
not need extended range, but they must deal with terrible reception anomalies. Even a "digitized" soldier, whose every
movement can be monitored, will require different display structures in the observing command center. This is the

classic three-dimensional chessboard at the tactical level.
On the subject of command and control, the individual soldier must be even better-trained than at present. He will face
human and material distractions everywhere--it will be hard to maintain concentration on the core mission. Soldiers
will die simply because they were looking the wrong way, and even disciplined and morally sound soldiers disinclined
to rape can lose focus in the presence of female or other civilians whom they feel obliged to protect or who merely add
to the human "noise level." The leader-to-led ratio must increase in favor of rigorously prepared low-level leaders.
While higher-level command structures may flatten, tactical units must become webs of pyramidal cells capable of
extended autonomous behavior in a combat environment where multiple engagements can occur simultaneously and in
relative isolation in the same building. Nonsensical arguments about the Wehrmacht making do without so many
NCOs and officers on the battlefield must be buried forever; not only is the German military of the last European civil
war ancient history, but it lost decisively. Our challenge is to shape the US Army of the 21st century.
Personal weapons must be compact and robust, with a high rate of fire and very lightweight ammunition, but there is
also a place for shotgun-like weapons at the squad level. Overall, soldier loads must be reduced dramatically at the
edge of combat, since fighting in tall buildings requires agility that a soldier unbalanced by a heavy pack cannot attain;
further, vertical fighting is utterly exhausting and requires specialized mobility tools. Soldiers will need more upper
body strength and will generally need to be more fit--and this includes support soldiers, as well.
Ideally, each infantry soldier would have a thermal or post-thermal imaging capability--since systems that require
ambient light are not much good 30 meters below the surface of the earth. Also, an enhanced ability to detect and
define sounds could benefit the soldier--although he would have to be very well-trained to be able to transcend the
distracting quality of such systems. Eventually, we may have individual-soldier tactical equipment that can
differentiate between male and female body heat distributions and that will even be able to register hostility and intent
from smells and sweat. But such devices will not be available for the next several interventions, and we shall have to
make do for a long time to come with soldiers who are smart, tough, and disciplined.
The roles of traditional arms will shift. Field artillery, so valuable elsewhere, will be of reduced utility--unless the US
military were to degenerate to the level of atrocity in which the Russians indulged themselves in Grozniy. Until
artillery further enhances accuracy, innovates warheads, and overcomes the laws of ballistic trajectories, it will not
have a significant role in urban combat divisions. Because of attack angles and the capabilities of precision munitions,
air power will prove much more valuable and will function as flying artillery. Mortars, however, may often be of great
use, given their steep trajectories. More accurate and versatile next-generation mortars could be a very powerful urban
warfare tool.
The bulk of tactical firepower will need to come from large-caliber, protected, direct-fire weapons. This means tanks,
or future systems descended from the tank. While today's tanks are death traps in urban combat--as the Russians were
recently reminded--the need for protected, pinpoint firepower is critical. Instead of concentrating entirely on
obsolescent rural warfare, armor officers should be asking themselves how the tank should evolve to fight in
tomorrow's premier military environment, the city. First, the "tank" will need more protection, and that protection will
need to be differently distributed--perhaps evolving to tuned electronic armor that flows over the vehicle to the
threatened spot. Main guns will need to be large caliber, yet, ideally, would be able to fire reduced-caliber
ammunition, as well, through a "caliber-tailoring" system. Crew visibility will need to be greater. The tank will not
need to sustain high speeds, but will need a sprint capability. Further, the tank will need to be better integrated into
local intelligence awareness.
While the need for plentiful dismounted infantry will endure, those soldiers will intermittently need means for rapid,
protected movement. But this does not necessarily mean mechanized infantry--rather, it may demand armored
transport centralized at the division level on which the infantry trains, but which does not rob the infantry of
manpower in peacetime or in combat.
Engineers will be absolutely critical to urban combat, but they, too, will need evolved tools and skills. The vertical
dimension is only part of the challenge. Engineers will need to develop expanded skills, from enabling movement in
developed downtown areas to firefighting. Demolition skills will be essential, but will be a long way from blowing

road craters. Tomorrow's combat engineers may have to drop 20-story buildings on minimal notice under fire while
minimizing collateral damage.
Aviation is vital to mobility, intelligence, and the delivery of focused firepower in urban environments, but, as
Mogadishu warned us, present systems and tactics leave us highly vulnerable. Rotary-wing aviation for urban combat
does not need great range or speed, but demands a richer defensive suite, great agility, and increased stealthiness.
Military intelligence must be profoundly reordered to cope with the demands of urban combat. From mapping to target
acquisition, from collection to analysis, and from battle damage assessment to the prediction of the enemy's future
intent, intelligence requirements in urban environments are far tougher to meet than they are on traditional battlefields.
The utility of the systems that paid off so richly in Desert Storm collapses in urban warfare, and the importance of
human intelligence (HUMINT) and regional expertise soars. From language skills to a knowledge of urban planning
(or the lack thereof), many of the abilities essential to combat in cities are given low, if any, priority in today's
intelligence architecture. While leaders are aware of these shortfalls, military intelligence is perhaps more a prisoner of
inherited Cold War structures than is any other branch--although field artillery and armor are competitive in their
unpreparedness for the future.
Military intelligence is at a crossroads today and must decide whether to continue doing the often-irrelevant things it
does so well or to embrace a realistic future which will demand a better balance between systems and soldiers in a
branch particularly susceptible to the lure of dazzling machines. Try templating a semi-regular enemy unit in urban
combat in the center of Lagos after 24 hours of contact. This does not mean that high-tech gear and analytical
methodologies are useless in urban environments. On the contrary, innovative technologies and organizational
principles could make a profound difference in how military intelligence supports urban combat operations. But we
would need to shift focus and explore radical departures from the systems we currently embrace.
Military police and civil affairs troops will continue to play the important roles they played in urban interventions
during the 20th century, but psychological operations (PSYOPS) units, long a step-child, will surge in importance, and
may ultimately merge fully with military intelligence to enhance synergy and efficiency. Especially given the potential
for electronic population control systems in the next century, PSYOPS may function as a combat arm, even if not
credited as such.
Even supply is different. While deliveries do not need to be made over great distances, soft vehicles are extremely
vulnerable in an environment where it is hard to define a front line and where the enemy can repeatedly emerge in the
rear. All soldiers will be fighters, and force and resource protection will be physically and psychologically draining.
Urban environments can upset traditional balances between classes of supply. There may be less of a requirement for
bulk fuel, but an intervention force may find itself required to feed an urban population, or to supply epidemic-control
efforts. Artillery and ATGM expenditures might be minimal, while main gun and infantry systems ammunition
consumption could be heated. Urban combat breaks individual and crew-served weapons and gear, from rifles to
radios, and masonry buildings are even harder on uniforms than on human bones. Soldiers will need replacement
uniforms far more often than during more traditional operations. Unfortunately, we also will need more replacement
soldiers, and all combat support and combat service support troops are more apt to find themselves shooting back
during an urban battle than in any other combat environment.

Where do we begin to prepare for this immediate and growing challenge? There are two powerful steps we ought to
take. First, the US Army should designate two active and at least one of our National Guard divisions as urban combat
divisions and should begin variable restructurings to get the right component mix. Rule one should be that the active
divisions are not "experimental" in the sense of nondeployable, but remain subject to short-notice deployment to
threatened urban environments. This would put an incredible stress on the unit and, especially, on the chain of
command. But today's US Army cannot afford to have any divisions "on ice," and, further, this pressure would drive
competence. Two such divisions is the irreducible initial number, since one urban combat division would be rapidly
exhausted by the pace of deployments.
Most of the divisional artillery would be shifted to corps-level, while engineers at all levels would be increased and
restructured--including the addition of organic sapper platoons to infantry battalions. Composite armor and

mechanized elements would be added to light forces at a ratio of one battalion (brigade) to four, with a longer-term
goal of developing more appropriate and readily deployable means of delivering direct firepower and protecting the
forward movement of troops. Innovative protection of general transport would be another goal. Military intelligence
units would have to restructure radically, and would need to develop habitual relationships with reserve component
linguists and area specialists. Aviation would work closely with other arms to develop more survivable tactics, while
each division would gain an active-duty PSYOPS company. Signalers would need to experiment with low-cost, offthe-shelf tools for communicating in dense urban environments, and an overarching effort would need to be made to
create interdisciplinary maps, both paper and electronic, that could better portray the complexity of urban warfare. The
divisions' experience would determine future acquisition requirements.
But none of the sample measures cited above is as important as revolutionizing training for urban combat. The present
approach, though worthwhile on its own terms, trains soldiers to fight in villages or small towns, not in cities. Building
realistic "cities" in which to train would be prohibitively expensive. The answer is innovation. Why build that which
already exists? In many of our own blighted cities, massive housing projects have become uninhabitable and industrial
plants unusable. Yet they would be nearly ideal for combat-in-cities training. While we could not engage in live-fire
training (even if the locals do), we could experiment and train in virtually every other regard. Development costs
would be a fraction of the price of building a "city" from scratch, and city and state governments would likely compete
to gain a US Army (and Marine) presence, since it would bring money, jobs, and development--as well as a measure
of social discipline. A mutually beneficial relationship could help at least one of our worst-off cities, while offering the
military a realistic training environment. The training center could be at least partially administered by the local
National Guard to bind it to the community. We genuinely need a National Training Center for Urban Combat, and it
cannot be another half-measure. Such a facility would address the most glaring and dangerous gap in our otherwise
superb military training program. We need to develop it soon.
In summary, an urbanizing world means combat in cities, whether we like it or not. Any officer who states
categorically that the US Army will never let itself be drawn into urban warfare is indulging in wishful thinking. Urban
combat is conceptually and practically different from other modes of warfare. Although mankind has engaged in urban
combat from the sack of Troy down to the siege of Sarajevo, Western militaries currently resist the practical,
emotional, moral, and ethical challenges of city fighting. Additional contemporary players, such as the media, and
international and nongovernmental organizations, further complicate contemporary urban combat. We do not want to
touch this problem. But we have no choice. The problem is already touching us, with skeletal, infected fingers. The US
military must stop preparing for its dream war and get down to the reality of the fractured and ugly world in which we
live--a world that lives in cities. We must begin judicious restructuring for urban combat in order to gain both
efficiency and maximum effectiveness--as well as to preserve the lives of our soldiers. We must equip, train, and fight
innovatively. We must seize the future before the future seizes us.
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